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This study investigates the phenomenon of role conflict
and role ambiguity between Commanding Officers (COs) and
Executive Officers (XOs) of U.S. Naval surface ships. It
begins by examining the unique relationship which exists
between Commanding Officers and their Executive Officers.
The need to delegate authority and the concept of dual
management with its related issues of task-oriented and
social-oriented leadership are reviewed and their applica-
tion to CO and XO roles is discussed. The implications of
informal command structures are then examined. The func-
tionality of their relationship is discussed including the
reasons why a division of upper level leadership tasks and
managerial roles of a command is made.
The analysis of the relationship of the level of role
ambiguity between a CO and XO and its effect on unit per-
formance was prepared using information from a locally
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I. INTRODUCTION
Navy Regulation, Article 0701:
The responsibility of the commanding officer for his
command is absolute, .... While he may, at his
discretion, and when not contrary to law or regulations,
delegate authority to his subordinates for the execution
of details, such delegations of authority shall in no way
relieve the commanding officer of his continued responsi-
bility for the safety, well-being, and efficiency of his
entire command. [Cope, 1966, p. 21]
The above quotation, taken from Command at Sea, describes
in a few words the unique situation faced by a commanding
officer of a naval ship. He is personally held responsible
and accountable for lives and well-being of his crew and
millions of dollars worth of equipment and yet while the
commanding officer is formally responsible for every aspect
of his command he must in practice delegate tasks to his
subordinates. The delegation of responsibilities for the
performance of certain functions can lead to the problems
of role ambiguity and role conflict. This role ambiguity
and role conflict will be the subject of this paper.
The terms role conflict and role ambiguity are frequently
used almost interchangeably in everyday conversation. For
purpose of this study it is important to draw a clear dis-
tinction between the two terms. This distinction will be
made using the following definitions provided by Katz and
Kahn:

We define role conflict as the simultaneous occurrence
of two or more role expectations such that compliance
with one would make compliance with the other more
difficult or impossible. [Katz and Kahn, 1978, p. 204]
In its prototypical form, role ambiguity simply means
uncertainty about what the occupant of a particular
office is supposed to do. But there may be uncertainty
as well about many other aspects of a role, including
the membership of the role-set, the ends to be served,
the role enactment, and evaluation of present role
behavior. [Katz and Kahn, 1978, p. 206]
Annually, the Naval Postgraduate School hosts a two-
week advanced seminar for Naval Organization Development
consultants. At a recent seminar the problem of Commanding
Officer/Executive Officer role conflict and role ambiguity
was the topic of one workshop presented. The workshop was
presented by two organization development consultants from
the Alameda Human Resources Detachment. These consultants
indicated that the problem of CO and XO role conflict and
role ambiguity is frequently encountered within the commands
they visited and felt that it lead to subsequent disharmony
and inefficiency at various levels within the commands.
Their belief that CO/XO role conflict would lead to poor
performance of a command appears intuitively obvious, but
this fact had not been empirically verified by them. In
fact, to the best of this researcher's knowledge, no formal
research has previously been done on this specific
relationship.
The purpose of this study is to conduct such empirical
research on role conflict and role ambiguity and the part
10

they play in the unique leadership situation faced by the
CO/XO team of a naval surface ship. This will be done by
first examining, with the aid of current literature, several
of the reasons why role ambiguity and role conflict fre-
quently exist between COs and XOs. The study will then
examine the extent to which a ship's performance is affected
by the level of role ambiguity which exists between the
first and second officers in command.
While this author can envision numerous cases in which
role conflict could exist on board a naval ship between a
CO and his XO , it is not the primary emphasis of this study
to examine role conflict. Rather, this paper will concen-
trate more on the phenomenon of CO/XO role ambiguity and its
effect on a ship's performance.
The procedures used in this study will be described in
detail in Chapter Three of this paper. Before describing
these procedures, however, it is necessary to briefly
review applicable literature to learn more about the reasons
why role ambiguity often exists between a CO and his XO and
its subsequent effect on organizational performance.
11

II, REVIEW OF LITERATURE
A. REASONS FOR ROLE AMBIGUITY
1 . Need to Delegate
The introduction o£ this paper suggested that the
major reason why role ambiguity exists between COs and XOs
of naval ships is that while the Commanding Officer is held
responsible for every aspect of his ship he must delegate
responsibility to subordinates. While every good CO
realizes this need to delegate, there are few definite
directives or guidance on which tasks he should delegate
and which he should retain. It, therefore, becomes the
purview of each CO to delegate and retain authority for
"the execution of details" as he or she sees fit. Not only
does the manner in which authority is delegated vary from
CO to CO; it was found to vary when a change in XOs
occurred. There are several other particularities of the
CO/XO relationship which can also contribute to role
ambiguity.
At this point, the author feels that it is important
to examine the unusual and, in many ways, unique relation-
ship which exists between a ship's Commanding Officer and his
Executive Officer. The relationship which has evolved is
quite different than that found between the number one and
number two members of most organizations and is an additional
12

source of role ambiguity. The uniqueness of this relation-
ship will be examined by first reviewing relevant research
concerning the effects of formal and informal "structures"
within an organization, and then by surveying literature on
the concept of Dual Management. An attempt will be made
to shoiv how these two areas contribute to the unusual CO/XO
relationship and also why they can promote role ambiguity.
The formal and informal command structures will now be
examined in terms of the formal and informal "Chains of
Command" which exist aboard ship,
2. Formal vs. Informal Chain of Command
One of the fundamental "classical" principles of an
effective organization is the concept of a need for unity
of command. So basic is this idea, it was listed as one of
the fourteen "Principles of Management" by Henri Fayol in
1930. Fayol is acknowledged as the founder of the classical
management school and his strong belief in this principle
is reflected in the following statement concerning his
theories of "Unity of Command":
Each employee must receive his or her instructions
about a particular operation from only one person.
Fayol believed that if an employee was responsible
to more than one superior, conflict in instruction
and confusion of authority would result. [Stoner,
1978, p. 43]
Fayol 's idea of "Unity of Command" might be expressed in
military terminology as a need for a strict "Chain of
Command." This is a system in which every man or woman
13

within a command would report to (or work for) only his or
her immediate superior within the command structure. An
examination of the working relationship of the Commanding
Officer and Executive Officer of a ship reveals that
rather than "Unity of Command" the actual situation is closer
to a Dual Management relationship. The concept of Dual
Management will be discussed in greater detail in a subse-
quent section of this review.
If one were to examine a line diagram showing the
structural organization of a ship, it would depict a rigid
delineation beginning with the Commanding Officer, Executive
Officer, the various department heads, division officers,
division Chief Petty Officers and on down. Figure 2-1
shows a model of this structure and represents the adver-
tised "Chain of Command" of the ship. However, if one asks
a ship's Chief Engineer whom he would first inform that the
ship has just had an engineering casualty, or ask the
Weapons Officer whom he would first inform that the ship's
number three gun mount is out of commission, both would
immediately say, "Why, the CO (Commanding Officer), of
course!" But wait a minute; what about the Chain of Command?
Shouldn't the department head tell the Executive Officer
and the Executive Officer tell the Commanding Officer?
Answers to a few questions like these soon cause even the
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in Figure 2-1 is not really a true picture. Figure 2-2
shows a different version of a shipboard Chain of Command
and one which conforms more closely to the actual command
structure
.
As discussed earlier, a ship's Commanding Officer is
ultimately responsible for everything which occurs onboard
his ship. In reality, howeve^", the Executive Officer in
most cases, handles the day-to-day administrative activities
of the ship to free the Commanding Officer to concern himself
with the external operations of the ship.
As previously discussed, the exact manner in which
managerial functions/duties are delegated varies from ship
to ship and CO to CO. The way in which these functions are
delegated is part of a ship's informal "Chain of Command."
In many cases the informal "Chain of Command" only remotely
resembles the published "Chain of Command." Without excellent
two-way communications between a ship's CO and XO it is easy
to see how the informal chain of command can lead to problems
of role ambiguity at their level. If problems of role
clarification exist at the CO/XO level, it can be surmised
it will be very difficult for those at other levels of the
Command to learn the various informal "Chains of Command"
that are present. Depending upon the situation, the informal
command structure may require a person to report to anyone of





















































































organization chart. This author contends that the inability
of juniors to recognize these informal "Chains of Command"
can create a great deal of ambiguity for the individual and in-
efficiency for the organization.
In his books
,
Silent Language and Beyond Culture
,
Edward Hall (1959, 1976) discusses in detail the formulation
and implications of formal and informal relations within a
culture or organization. He provides the following insight
into the effect of violating informal command structures;
Mishandling the informal can often lead to serious
difficulties which are apt to become aggravated since
the participants in an informal situation are net fully
conscious of what is going on. They only know that
under a certain set of unstated rules they can act in
a certain way and depend upon other people to react
appropriately. [Hall, 1959, pp. 104-105]
The situation becomes even more acute when the environment
changes as for example when a new CO assumes command and
the informal "Chains of Command" change. Hall continues:
This informal expectancy is often ruptured when there
is a conflict between two patterns within the context
of our own culture or in the more familiar case of a
cross-cultural situation. [Hall, 1959, p. 105]
In essence, the new CO will bring with him his own ideas on
how "things should be done," that is, his own "informal."
The XO and the rest of the command will, therefore, be
forced to learn a new informal structure.
3. Dual Management
The final cause of role ambiguity to be considered
is the perception held by many officers that a ship's CO
18

and XO should divide the upper level managerial tasks
between them based on their position alone. Those who
espouse this philosophy normally believe the CO should
primarily assum^e the role of social-emotional leader and
the XO should perform the task-oriented leadership functions.
The division of roles on this basis has been referred to
as Co-Management [Senger. 1971] and Dual -Management [Vaught
and Mashburn, 1980].
Dual leadership theories, which emerged from
research by Bale (1958), Etzioni (1965), and Burke
(1967) , attempt to establish a relationship between
group effectiveness and the behavior of two leaders
i\fho have collective line authority over the group's
members. [Kaplan, 1979, p. 28]
According to dual leadership theories, an individual
with an authoritative leadership style tends to do well in
a task-oriented situation. He is able to focus his attention
on the short-range goal or problem and will usually do what-
ever it takes to get the job done. He thrives on challenges
and needs short-range feedback. These characteristics allow
such a person to be extremely effective in accomplishing
task-oriented leadership functions. Because of his strong
desire to achieve short-term objectives the authoritarian
leader tends to be, or at least appears to be, insensitive
to the needs of personnel working under him. Because people
believe that the authoritarian leader is not really con-
cerned about their welfare, he does not make a good counselor,
The authoritarian's continued use of task-oriented behavior
19

will produce good results goal-wise. However, it has an
adverse effect on morale. His subordinates view him as a
task-master and, if he tries to change and behave in a
social-oriented manner, he is still perceived by the group
in his former role. He is locked into the role his sub-
ordinates have seen him operate in. [Vaught and Mashburn,
1980]
Likewise, research has shown that certain charac-
teristics associated with a democratic leader are some of
those which are necessary in a manager's job. For example,
he is concerned with the feelings of others and has a strong
need for frequent communication with his subordinates.
[Boyatzis, 1974] Various literary works suggest that
people must feel that their leaders are truly concerned
for their welfare in order to perform well and to be loyal
to the firm. [Bales, 1985; Bales and Slater, 1955; Katz and
Kahn, 1978; Senger, 1971]
To the best of this author's knowledge, the Navy has
made no formal attempt to instruct its officers in the
validity or non-validity of Dual -Management theories.
However, based on the action of some COs and XOs in the
fleet, there appears to be considerable acceptance of this
theory. In a report by John Senger, published in 1971, he
states:
A survey of Naval Officers who served in 312 separate
commands during their careers revealed that in tO-s of
20

the cases the task and the social functions were divided
between the Commanding Officer and the second in command.
Within this 601, the Commanding Officer assumed the social
role 37^ of the time, with the Executive Officer carry-
ing out the task role. In the remaining 23-0, the roles
were reversed. In the 40% remaining, the situation was
not so divided, the two officers both assumed the social
role in 9-6, and 19% the Commanding Officer assumed both
task and social leadership roles, essentially acting in
capacity of a "Great Man." In all the cases within the
19%, the officer was considered effective in both roles.
[Senger, 1971, p. 79]
The relevance of Dual Management theory to this study
is that Dual Management creates the potential for role
ambiguity. Role ambiguity is likely to occur when the CO and
XO of a ship have opposing views on the validity of this
theory. The importance of good communication between a CO
and XO to gain understanding of each other's position on
this concept would appear to be of critical importance.
B. ROLE CONFLICT AND THE ORGANIZATION
The previous section of this chapter examined the
relationship which exists on board a Naval surface ship,
between the CO and XO and suggested several factors which
are likely to create role conflict and role ambiguity.
The attention of the chapter will now be turned toward a
review of previous literature on role conflict and role
ambiguity and its possible application to the current study.
1 . Types of Role Conflict
One of the most often referenced books on the
subjects of role conflict and role ambiguity i^ Organizational
21

Stress; Studies in Role Conflict and Ambiguity by Kahn
,
Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek and Rosenthal. Kahn et al . (1964) have
conducted several detailed studies on these subjects and
have identified six types of role conflict that they suggest
are common in most organizations.
Stoner (1978) provides the following descriptions and
examples of the six types of role conflict identified by
Kahn et al . (1964) :
1. Intrasender conflict occurs when a single super-
visor presents a subordinate with an incompatible set
of orders or expectations. For example, a division
manager orders a purchasing agent to buy materials
immediately at a price which requires prior home office
authorization, and then warns the agent not to violate
the rulebook regulations.
2. Intersender conflict arises when orders or expecta-
tions from^ one person or group clash with the expectations
from other persons or groups. This can occur, for example,
when a superior orders a foreman to engage in tighter super-
vision, while the work crew makes clear that any attempt
to comply with this order will lead to serious trouble
in the ranks
.
3. Inter-role conflict occurs when the different roles
played by the same person give rise to conflicting
demands. In his roles as husband and father, for
example, a man may be pressed to be home with his wife
and family in the evening and on weekends, but in his
role as loyal worker, the same man may have to put in
a considerable amount of overtime to get his work done.
This particular example of inter-role conflict is
extremely common and often creates great tension, both
on the job and at home.
4. Person-role conflict occurs when on-the-job role
requirements run counter to the individual's needs or
values. An executive ordered to bribe a domestic or
foreign official might find the assignment completely
antithetical to his or her moral values. Yet his or
her desire for career success might make refusal to
carry out the order difficult.
22

5. In role overload conflict, the individual is con-
fronted with orders and expectations from a number of
sources that cannot be completed within the given time
and quality limits. Should quality be sacrificed in
the interests of time? Should some tasks be carried out
and others ignored? If so, which tasks should get
priority? Dilemmas like these are a constant part of
the manager's job.
6. Role ambiguity occurs when the individual is provided
with insufficient or unclear information about his or her
responsibilities. The individual is therefore uncertain
about what he or she is "supposed" to do. Role ambiguity
is often experienced by new managers who are given a set
of duties and responsibilities without being told exactly
how to carry them out. The stress experienced by the
individual in such a situation can be considerable.
[Stoner, 1978, pp. 536-538]
As noted above, role ambiguity is in essence, one
form of role conflict. Most authors that have dealt with
this subject tend to consolidate the first five types of
role conflict listed above into one group which they refer
to as "role conflict" and then deal with role ambiguity as
a separate area. Hence much of the literature in this area
discusses role conflict and role ambiguity as if they were
separate rather than role ambiguity simply being a sub-set
of role conflict. [Kahn et al
.
, 1974; Katz and Kahn , 1978;
Scott, Mitchell, and Birnbaum, 1981; Rizzo, House, Lirtzman,
1970; Schuler, 1975; Tosi and Tosi, 1970]
In keeping with the precedence set by previous
researchers in this area, the terms role conflict and role
ambiguity will be treated as if they are separate and dis-
tinguishable phenomena in this study.
23

2. Applicability to Naval Surface Ships
The fact that role conflict and role ambiguity exist
in many organizations and that they create problems for the
organizations as well as the individuals within the organi-
zation is well documented. Many of the conditions which
lead to role conflict and role ambiguity for civilian organi-
zations also exist aboard a Naval ship and have similar
consequences. Rizzo, House, and Lirtzman (1970) provide
the following passage which summarizes previous research on
some of these conditions. Considering the dual command
hierarchy under which Naval surface ships function, the
passage is quite applicable to this study and also provides
an excellent list of references on the subject as well.
Rizzo et al
. (1970) state:
Professional organizations frequently exhibit violations
of the chain-of -command principle. As Blau and Scott
(1962) pointed out, two sources of authority exist when
organizational discipline is based not only on position
power- -supported by formal sanctions, and derived from
the legal contract governing employment of the organi-
zational member and the formal sanctions vested in the
superior position--but also on professional expertise
which is enforced by collegial authority. Several
studies have shown that (1) multiple authority disrupts
the individual's orientation to his organization or to
his profession by requiring him to choose between the two
(Kaplan, 1959; Etzioni, 1959; LaPorte, 1965; Evans, 1962;
Reissman, 1949; Gouldner, 1958a, 1958b); (2) individuals
oriented primarily toward their professional norms are
more critical of the organization and more likely to
ignore administrative details (Blau and Scott, 1962);
and (3) professionals in such organizations frequently
experience stress as a result of being caught in the
middle. (Kaplan, 1959; LaPorte, 1965; Evan, 1962).





3. Effects of Role Conflict and Role Ambiguity
A great deal has been written concerning the negative
effects of role conflict and role ambiguity on individuals
and organizations. The theme running through these articles
is that role conflict and role ambiguity have an overall
adverse effect. The following quotations are typical of
those found in the literature describing the effect of these
two conditions on organizations and individuals within those
organizations; Tosi (1971) states that:
Role conflict was negatively correlated with job satis-
faction and positively correlated with job threat and
anxiety. [Tosi, 1971, p. 17]
Moreover, role conflicts tend to reduce one's general
satisfaction with the job and the conditions surround-
ing it, and to undermine one's confidence in his






Cohen concluded that ambiguity of the situation and
inconsistency of direction raised the anxiety of sub-
ordinates
,
caused a less favorable attitude towards
supervision, and lowered productivity. [Tosi, 1971,
p. 10]
The presence of conflicting and/or ambiguous pressures
is considered to indicate a level of organizational
stress. Both role conflict and role ambiguity have been
demonstrated to be related negatively to role behavior
of the focal person. [Tosi, 1971, pp. 8-9]
As Tosi (1971) and others have noted, the negative
effects of role conflict and ambiguity apply to the physical
well-being of individuals as well as the organization. Tosi
continues
:
Responses to role pressures may take the form of behavior,
affective reactions, and/or physiological symptoms. The
25

specific nature of the response is a function of the
role pressures as affected by the interpersonal relations
and the personal attributes of the focal person. When
the sent role pressures are clearly understood and there
are no inconsistencies with other role demands, there will
be few problems. However, the existence of role conflict
and role ambiguity could pose problems for the individual
and the organizations. [Tosi, 1971, p. 9]
Smith (1957) conducted an experimental study with
140 college students in which he varied the amount of role
ambiguity the students were subjected to and measured the
effect on problem solving. His results as reported by
Rizzo, et al., (1970) showed that:
(1) when groups were asked to solve problems without
clarification of the role each member was to perform
their efficiency was significantly less than when the
roles were made clear; (2) role ambiguity markedly reduced
group satisfaction with the experience; and (3) the hostili
ty level was significantly higher for groups under condi-
tions of role ambiguity as compared to control groups.
[Rizzo, et al
.
, 1970, p. 154]
In a discussion of role ambiguity, Scott, Mitchell and
Birnbaum (1981) state:
The overall picture is that ambiguity makes it harder
for us to do our jobs. We prefer certainty, ... it
should be obvious that in ambiguous situations, the
contingencies about what-leads -to-what are unclear.
This is a very unpleasant situation for most employees.
[Scott, et al., 1981, p. 105]
Stoner (1978) notes that role ambiguity is often a
problem for new managers who are assigned a set of duties
but are not told exactly how to carry them out. He adds
that:
The stress experienced by the individuals in such a
situation can be considerable. [Stoner, 1978, p. 538]
26

An even more ominous picture of the problem is
presented by- Scott et al
. (1981) in the following passage:
Research shows ambiguity leads to greater stress and
tension and lower satisfaction and self-esteem. Some
data from medical research shows that ambiguity may
increase heart problems, and lead to anxiety and depression
Finally some studies with more "hard" data suggest that
turnover is greater and productivity lower when role
ambiguity exists, [Scott et al
. , 1981, p. 105]
Kahn et al . (1964) state:
In their extreme form, conflict and ambiguity pose for the
individual an almost insurmountable problem.
. . . Condi-
tions of conflict and ambiguity, therefore, are not merely
irritating; in persistent and extreme forms they are
identity destroying. [Kahn, et al
.
, 1964, p. 61]
Some people experience a rather marked sense of futility
when confronted with conflicts. A loss of self-esteem
is often apparent. Others show symptoms of acute
anxiety, and of confusion and indecision, which may leave
them immobilized for a time. And for a few, symptoms of
hysteria and psychosomatic disorders seem to be connected
to tensions engendered by conflicts.* [Kahn et al . , 1964,
p. 67]
4. Effect of Conflict and Ambiguity vs. Organizational
Level
As the previous examples demonstrate, the literature
is rather specific concerning the adverse effects of role
conflict and role ambiguity. One inconsistency, however, is
that research indicates that role conflict and role ambiguit
are not always negatively related to job satisfaction.
Schuler (1975) provides the following summary of these
findings
:
Tosi and Tosi (1970) and Tosi (1971) found that role
conflict and job satisfaction were negatively related,
but they found no relationship between role ambiguity




Rizzo (1972), and Hamner and Tosi (1974) found signifi-
cant negative relationships between job satisfaction and
role ambiguity but no relationships between job satis-
faction and role conflict. [Schuler, 1975, p. 683]
Subsequent research has suggested that these in-
consistencies can be reconciled by comparing the relation-
ships between role ambiguity and job satisfaction, and
between role conflict and job satisfaction in light of an
individual's position within the organizational structure.
These studies indicate that role ambiguity and job satis-
faction are more negatively related than are role conflict
and job satisfaction for employees at the higher levels of
an organization. [Hamner and Tosi, 1974; Schuler, 1975]
The following rationale for these differences is
provided by Kahn et al. (1964) and Hamner and Tosi (1974).
They suggest that role conflict is more stressful to lower
level employees because they are more dependent on their
supervisor and have little power to influence him. Since
their role within the organization is normally well-defined,
role ambiguity is less of a problem.
Employees at the upper level of the organization are
better able to control role conflict situations because they
have the asset or ability to deal with them. However, cases
of role ambiguity are not as easily handled and hence cause
greater stress. [Kahn et al . , 1964; Hamner and Tosi, 1974]
This current study is concerned with how role conflict
or role ambiguity between a ship's CO and XO affects the
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ship in a variety of areas and at different levels within a
command. Chapter three describes the methodology used and





The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader
with an overview of the research method employed for this
study. It describes the sample population, the data collec-
tion methods, the research hypotheses to be tested, and the
procedures for the statistical analysis of data collected.
A. STUDY OVERVIEW
The objective of this study was to determine to what
extent unit effectiveness of Naval surface ships is associa-
ted with role ambiguity between a ship's Commanding Officer
and his Executive Officer. The study was designed to
empirically test for the existence of a correlation between
the level of role ambiguity between the CO and XO and unit
effectiveness on several key measures.
As most readers of this study are aware the Navy is
composed of a number of different subsets or communities.
These communities include shore commands, surface ship
commands, aviation commands, and submarine commands. The
author of this study chose to limit the test population to
surface ship commands for several reasons.
These reasons include:
(1) The large number of surface ships homeported
in relatively close proximity to the Naval
Postgraduate School facilitated data collection
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(2) Standardized performance data was available
for surface units.
(3) The relationship between the CO and XO of
a surface ship is unique in many respects
from the other types of Naval commands.
The author was interested in examining this
relationship in greater detail.
(4) The potential for wide-range application of
any significant findings to improve the
performance of a large percentage of Naval
commands
.
(5) The professional background of the author and
his personal interests in this area was also
a major factor in limiting the study to surface
units
.
Many types of indicators have been used by previous
researchers to assess unit performance. Some of these
include Naval Force Status Reports (NAVFORSTAT reports)
,
refresher and team training scores, medical and non- judicial
punishment records, various readiness inspections, weapons
firing exercises, ship qualification trials, squadron
efficiency awards, and retention statistics. [Kaplan, 1979]
This researcher selected three indicators of unit performance
These were NAVFORSTAT data, retention statistics, and unit
cleanliness and appearance. It was felt each of these
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measures would be affected to some extent by the level of
[
CO/XO role ambiguity. Additionally, these measures were
uniformly available for each unit in the sample population.
B. SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
A sample of twenty Naval surface ships was used for this
study. Of the twenty ships fifteen were homeported in
San Diego and five in Alameda. The sample included destroyer,
amphibious, and auxiliary type ships. A convenience sample,
subject to the following criteria, was used:
(1) The ships were selected on their inport
availability in either San Diego or Alameda.
(2) The ship's CO/XO team had to have been
together for at least six months prior to
administration of the questionnaire.
Other than the two criteria listed above, the sampling
was done on a random basis. The researcher would first call
the ship's XO to confirm whether or not criterion two was
met. If the CO/XO team had been together for at least six
months, they would be asked to fill out a questionnaire. It
was felt that for teams which had been together for less
than six months the level of role ambiguity would not be a
good indicator of differences in unit performance. The
level of ambiguity would be expected to be high for a new
team, but it would be expected to decrease naturally over
time. The key idea of the study was to see if in cases where
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a high level of ambiguity still existed after more than six
months, unit performance was lower than for other ships in
the sample.
C. THE INSTRUMENT
As has been previously stated the main focus of this
study was to see what effect CO/XO role conflict in general,
and role ambiguity in particular, have on a ship's performance
in several key areas. The questionnaire included as
Appendix A was developed by the author to measure the level
of role ambiguity between COs and XOs . The questionnaire
consists .of a cover letter and two additional parts. Part I
asks for general demographic information, and part II con-
tains a list of 30 leadership and managerial tasks.
The cover letter which accompanied the questionnaire
was written to fulfill several functions. In addition to
giving instructions on how the questionnaires were to be
filled out and the purpose of the study, it provides a
statement of confidentiality. As noted by Stone (1978),
respondents are likely to be more honest in their responses
if they are convinced their inputs are anonymous. To this
end, not only was the statement of confidentiality included
in the cover letter, this promise was also reaffirmed to





The cover letter also provided a legend of the code
letters to be used to complete part II of the questionnaire.
The codes are a modified form of those used by Beckhard and
Harris (1977) in conjunction with "Responsibility Charting."
Responsibility charting is a method proposed by Beckhard
and Harris which can be used by an organization to help
clarify employee roles and allocate work responsibilities.
[Beckhard and Harris, 1977]
Part I of the questionnaire asks for relatively straight-
forward information. The questions are easy for the respon-
dent to answer and are non-threatening in nature. The intent
of part I is two-fold; first it gathers useful demographic
data, and second, it helps put the respondent somewhat at
ease. This allows the subject to slowly work his way into
the questionnaire and helps to reduce any anxiety he may be
feeling about the survey.
Part I also asked each CO and XO to assess on a scale
of (1) to (5) to what extent they had discussed the division
of command leadership and managerial tasks. The purpose of
this question was to see if individual CO/XO teams were in
agreement on the extent to which they had discussed these
matters. The author was interested in seeing whether there
was a relationship between the extent to which a team had
discussed these issues and the level of role ambiguity as
measured in part II of the instrument.
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Part II of the questionnaire contains a list of 30
leadership or managerial tasks normally performed by a
ship's CO or XO. This list was developed from several
sources including the book Command at Sea
,
the author's own
experience, and inputs from an NPS faculty member with
previous ship command experience. The list was in no way
meant to be all inclusive but rather to provide a measure-
ment tool. An attempt was made to select tasks which rou-
tinely occur and which COs and XOs who communicated well
with each other would be able to independently identify
which officer was primarily responsible for the task. The
degree to which they were or were not able to do this was used
to determine the level of role ambiguity.
Another consideration in the design of the "questions" in
part II was to see to what extent the practice of Dual
Management discussed earlier was indicated by the respondents.
Since some of the questions dealt with "task-oriented
leadership," and others dealt with "social-oriented leader-
ship," the manner in which responsibilities were divided
was able to be investigated in light of Dual Management
theory as well. The results of this investigation are to
be the subject of a subsequent report.
D. SURVEY METHOD
Since a critical element of this study was to determine
the level of role ambiguity which existed between a CO and
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his XO, it was necessary for them to fill out the questionnaire
independently and without collusion. In order to control
for this factor, the author administered each questionnaire
personally. The same process was used with each ship to
ensure uniformity of questionnaire administration. The CO
and XO were briefed separately on the purpose of the
questionnaire and the use of the results. The factor of
confidentiality was stressed and any questions they had
were answered. They would then complete the questionnaire
without knowledge of how their counterpart had responded.
After they both completed the forms, some CO/XO teams wanted
to compare responses, some chose not to. The comparing of
responses provided them with what this researcher hopes was
useful feedback and yet did not bias the study.
The level of role ambiguity for each command was com-
pared with three categories of performance data. These
categories are briefly discussed below:
1. Retention Statistics
Retention statistics for ships are available in a
variety of forms covering various periods of time. The
statistics are broken down into a number of different
categories, including first-term, second-term, and career
reenlistments. Statistics are computed quarterly for each
ship for each of these categories. An overall net retention
percentage is also computed for each ship on a quarterly
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basis. The overall retention statistic provides the
percentage of personnel aboard a ship who were eligible
to reenlist versus those who actually reenlisted in all
three categories. For this study, an average retention
percentage for the past six months was used. That is the
overall retention percentage for the second and third
quarters of 1982 were averaged together to obtain an
indicator of how well the ship was performing in this area.
2. Naval Force Status Report (NAVFORSTAT) Data
The NAVFORSTAT report provides a ship's commanding
officer with a means of keeping both his operational and
administrative commanders advised of the readiness of his
ship to perform her assigned missions. The Commanding
Officer is required to submit estimates or readiness ratings
for his ship on a periodic basis and whenever a signifi-
cant change of readiness occurs. Four measured resource
ratings and an overall rating are computed by the ship
based on its abilities to perform her assigned missions.
The readiness ratings are based on a scale from (1) to (5)
.
A measured resource rating of (1) indicates complete readi-
ness of a ship to perform in her assigned mission areas and
a (4) indicates complete mission degradation. A rating of
(5) is a special case for a unit which due to service pro-
grams (such as an overhaul period) does not possess the
prescribed wartime resources or cannot perform a wartime
mission for which it is organized. [OPNAVINST C3501.66B]
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Four measured resource ratings and the overall
readiness rating were looked at for purposes of this study.
A brief description of each of these follows:
1. Overall Readiness Rating
This rating represents the combined effects of
all primary mission and resource area ratings.
Mission areas included in the overall rating will
vary from ship type to ship type, but would consist
of such areas as mobility, command and control,
amphibious warfare, anti-submarine warfare, and
surface warfare.
2. Personnel Readiness
This rating indicates how closely the number of
personnel available on board a unit compares to
the structured strength (officer and enlisted)
specified by the ship's Unit Manpower Authorization
It is designed to provide an estimate of how
effectively the ship should be able to perform




This measure provides an estimate of how
closely quantities of wartime combat essential
equipment, support equipment and supplies which are
prescribed to perform the stated wartime mission




This rating compares the combat-essential
equipment or subsystems and major end items pre-
scribed to perform a ship's wartime missions with
the equipment onboard. This measure considers both
missing and inoperative equipment in arriving at an
estimate of readiness.
5. Training Readiness
This is an estimate of how the present level
of training compares with the training requirements
specified by the ship's type -commander for a fully
trained ship. [OPNAVINST C3501.66B; Kaplan, 1979]
The mission readiness ratings used for this study
were based on status of the sample ships as of September 30,
1982. The ratings were obtained from the quarterly force
validation messages for the third quarter of 1982. These
scores were felt to be the best indicator of the current
status of the sample ships during the time frame the role
ambiguity questionnaires were being administered during the
period 29 September through 22 October 1982.
3. Appearance and Cleanliness
The general appearance and cleanliness of a Naval
ship is viewed by many as an important performance criterion
The essence of this point is captured in the following
quotation on shipboard cleanliness from Command at Sea :
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Run she will and shine she'd better. It is an
excellent motto for any ship interested in main-
taining a high state of material readiness. If the
ship is "good" in this sense, it is usually a "good ship"
in the morale and operational sense, also because good
men like to be around good equipment and it takes good
men to keep equipment in good shape. [Cope, 1966, p. 297]
Because of the emphasis placed on a ship's appearance
and cleanliness, a "rough" measurement of this attribute was
included in this study. An appearance/cleanliness score or
rating was assigned to each ship visited. This researcher
rated the ships in the sample from one to five, with one
indicating a very clean and well -maintained ship and five
indicating an extremely dirty and poorly maintained ship.
These ratings were based only on the observations of the
author and were not confirmed by others. However, in this
author's opinion, there was a marked difference in the
appearance of the ships and this measure is a potentially
useful one. It is readily acknowledged that a second or
third opinion on this measure would have been helpful in
reducing some of the subjectiveness of this measure.
E. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES AND STATISTICAL METHOD
Upon completion of the data collection phase of the study
described above the results were analyzed with the aid of
the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS)
computer programs. SPSS is an integrated package of com-
puter programs designed specifically for use with social
science data. It is a system which allows the user to
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analyze data in an easy and convenient manner. [Nie, Hull,
Jenkins, Steinbrenner, and Bent, 1975]
The SPSS programs and sample data collected were used to
test the following research hypotheses:
1) Hypothesis number one (H:l):
CO/XO teams which have discussed the division o£
command leadership and managerial tasks to a greater extent
will have lower levels of role ambiguity (i.e., there will
be a significant negative correlation between extent of dis-
cussion and level of role ambiguity)
.
2) Hypothesis number two (H:2):
Ships on which the CO/XO teams have lower levels of
role ambiguity will have better (lower) NAVFORSTAT performance
ratings (i.e., there will be a significant positive corre-
lation between level of role ambiguity and NAVFORSTAT per-
formance ratings)
.
3) Hypothesis number three (H:3):
Ships on which CO/XO teams have lower levels of role
ambiguity will have better (lower) scores for appearance/
cleanliness (i.e., there will be a significant positive
correlation between level of role ambiguity and appearance/
cleanliness scores)
.
4) Hypothesis number four (H:4):
Ships on which the CO/XO team have lower levels of
role ambiguity will have better (higher) retention rates.
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(i.e., there will be a significant negative correlation
between level of role ambiguity and retention rates).
A detailed discussion of the results of this study and
an analysis of the data are presented in Chapter Four.
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IV. DESCRIPTION OF FINDINGS
This chapter describes the results o£ the statistical
analysis performed on the data collected in connection with
this study. The thrust of the analysis was to determine
the degree of correlation which exists between CO/XO role
ambiguity and a ship's performance. The manner in
which the data was collected was discussed in Chapter
Three of this report; the author's attention in this chapter
will focus primarily on the implications suggested by the data
A. DATA SUMMARY
The following summary includes the variable names , a
synopsis of the key results of each variable, and where
appropriate, an explanation of the attribute measured by
a given variable. In several cases the author has also
included statements designed to aid the reader in inter-
preting the results.
1. Level of Role Ambiguity
The range of possible scores on this attribute was
from zero (0) to thirty (30), with a low numerical score
indicating a lower level of role ambiguity.
The level of role ambiguity for the CO/XO teams
surveyed ranged from a low of one (1) to a high of thirteen
(13). A mean score of 6.75 and a mode of 5.0 were obtained.
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Eighty-five percent (851) of the scores were 5.0 or higher
for the attribute. These scores suggest two points to the
author: First, the wide range of scores indicates that the
level of role ambiguity does vary considerably from one ship
to another and, second, the relatively high mean score of
6.75 indicates that on the average some role ambiguity
existed between CO/XO teams on better than 20 percent of
the leadership tasks listed on the measurement instrument.
2
.
Extent of Discussion from CO's View
This was a measure of the extent the COs surveyed
felt they had discussed with their XOs the manner in which
they desired the command leadership tasks to be handled.
The scores on this item ranged from a low of two (2) , which
indicated "To a little extent," to a high of five (5),
which meant "To a very great extent."
3. Extent of Discussion XO's View
This is the same measure as described above but
from the XO's point of view. The scores received from the
XOs also ranged from two (2) to five (5). However, they
had a mean score of 3.55 and a mode score of 3.00 on this
question. Seventeen (17) out of twenty (20) of the XOs
marked this question with a four (4) or lower. This would
suggest the collective XOs felt the distribution of leader-
ship tasks had been discussed to a lesser extent than did
their COs. This point will be examined in greater detail





As noted in Chapter Three, this NAVFORSTAT rating
is in essence a combined readiness rating for a ship based
on a number of different factors. The reader is reminded
that "all" NAVFORSTAT ratings reported on in this paragraph
and below are scaled from one (1) , corresponding to complete
mission readiness, to four (4), corresponding to complete
mission degradation. The Overall Readiness Rating scores
for ships in this study ranged from two (2) to four (4)
.
This rating had a mean score of 2.95.
5 Personnel Readiness Rating
The scores on this NAVFORSTAT rating ranged from
one (1) to four (4) and had a mean score of 2.25.
6 Supply Readiness Rating
This measure was also obtained from NAVFORSTAT
data. A mean score of 1.90 on a range from one (1) to
four (4) was observed.
7. Equipment Readiness Rating
Also a NAVFORSTAT measure, the equipment readiness
rating scores ranged from one (1) to four (4) with the




This is the last NAVFORSTAT rating which was
examined. On this measure the mean was 1.5 5 and the range




9 . Retention Rate
The retention rates for the ships ranged from a low
of thirteen percent (13%) to a high of fifty-nine (591). The
mean retention score was 32.35%. However, the scores were
fairly evenly distributed over the entire range of retention
rates and no central tendency was noted. As discussed
earlier, the retention ratings used in this study were the
ship's overall retention percentages for the six-month




As discussed in Chapter Three, this measure was
based on the author's assessment of the ship's general
appearance and cleanliness. The scores ranged from one (1),
indicating exceptional appearance, to five (5), indicating
an extremely dirty ship. A mean score of 2.45 was observed.
11. Composite of All Rating Variables
This measure was computed based on an arithmetic average
of the five NAVFORSTAT ratings plus the retention and appear-
ance measures. The retention ratings were grouped into
categories from (1) to (5) prior to their inclusion in this
composite. Appendix B shows the manner in which the ship's
retention ratings were assigned into these categories.
The composite rating was calculated in an attempt to
obtain an overall performance indicator for each ship. The
composite scores ranged from a low of 1.71 to a high of 3.14.
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A lower score on this measure indicated better performance.
A score of one (1) would correspond to the best possible
rating and four point two eight (4.28) the worst possible
rating. The mean composite score was 2.315 for the ships
surveyed. Seventy-five percent (751) of the ships had
composite scores of 2.57 or lower (better).
Table 4-1 provides a list of the raw data collected
during this study and which has been summarized above. The
reader will note that the NAVFORSTAT raw data has been
omitted. This was necessary because NAVFORSTAT data is
classified information and the author desired to keep this
study unclassified. The author has included in Appendix C
of this study the frequency charts and histograms of the




As has been noted several times, the main focus of this
study was to see what relationship (if any) exists between
the level of role ambiguity between a CO and his XO and the
performance of their ship. In Chapter Three the author
listed four hypotheses concerning the relationships which
were to be tested. For the reader's convenience, these
hypotheses are restated below:
H:1--C0/X0 teams which have discussed the division
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extent will have lower levels of role ambiguity
(i.e., there will be a negative correlation between
Extent of Discussion from CO's View and Level of Role
Ambiguity, and Extent of Discussion from XO's View and
Level of Role Ambiguity)
.
H: 2 --Ships on which the CO/XO teams have lower levels of
role ambiguity will have better (lower) NAVFORSTAT per-
formance ratings (i.e., there will be a positive
correlation between Level of Role Ambiguity and Overall
Readiness, Personnel Readiness, Supply Readiness, Equip-
ment Readiness, and Training Readiness).
H: 3- -Ships on which the CO/XO teams have lower levels of
role ambiguity will have better (lower) scores for
appearance/cleanliness (i.e., Level of Role .Ajnbiguity and
Appearance will be positively correlated.
H:4--Ships on which the CO/XO teams have lower levels
of role ambiguity will have better (higher) retention
rates (i.e., Level of Role Ambiguity and Retention will
be negatively correlated)
.
Because of the limitations placed on this researcher by
time and availability of ships to survey, a sample of con-
venience, rather than purely random sample was used for this
study. Since the study was not completely random, the data
was analyzed using non-parametric tests. The principal
procedure used to test the above hypotheses was the examination
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of Spearman correlation coefficients. These are also
known as the Spearman's rho (denoted r ). The coefficients
obtained with the Spearman procedure vary from +1.0 (indi-
cating a perfect positive relationship between two variables)
to -1.0 (indicating a perfect negative relationship). A
coefficient of 0.0 indicates that no relationship at all
exists between the two variables.
Table 4-2 provides a summary of the Spearman correlation
coefficients for the variables tested in this study and shows
to what extent they are related to the level of role ambiguity
(LRA)
.
Also included in this table is the significance level
for each coefficient.
Hypotheses (H:l) through (H:4) will now be examined in
light of the data presented in Table 4-2. Due to the small
size of the sample used in this study a significance level
of 0.10 or less was considered to be statistically signifi-
cant for purposes of this analysis. The reader is, of
course, free to draw his own conclusions from the data.
1. Hypothesis (H:l) appears to be very well supported
by this study. Both Extent of Discussion from CO • s View and
Extent of Discussion from XO's View show a relatively strong
negative correlation with Level of Role Ambiguity. The
-0.4775 coefficient for Extent of Discussion from CO ' s View
was found to be significant to the .017 level. Extent of





The following table lists the values o£ the Spearman
correlation coefficients for CO/XO level of role ambiguity
and the remaining variables used in this study. In addition
to the coefficient is the level of significance for each
correlation coefficient:
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT SIGNIFICANCE
Extent of Discussion from
CO's View






















significance level of .076 does not indicate as strong a
negative relationship but still provides good support for
the hypothesis. This would suggest that Level of Role
Ambiguity can be reduced by the CO and XO actively dis-
cussing the distribution of managerial/leadership tasks.
2. Hypothesis (H:2) was partially supported by this
study. The strongest relationships were indicated between
Level of Role Ambiguity and Personnel Readiness and Training
Readiness. Both of these measures were significant to the
.05 level or better. If we relax the significance level to
0.10, the .3046 coefficient for Overall Readiness and .3103
coefficient for Supply Readiness can also be viewed as
supporting the hypothesis. The data does not indicate that
any relationship exists between Level of Role .Ajnbiguity and
Equipment Readiness. This result is possibly due to the
fact that the direct authority for ensuring a ship's manning
level, measured by Personnel Readiness, and Training Readiness
would be major concerns at the CO/XO level.
3. Hypothesis CH:3}, that Level of Role Ambiguity is
positively correlated with a ship's cleanliness and appear-
ance, was not supported by the data from this study. The
near zero coefficient received for this variable was sur-
prising, but is possibly explained in part by the rather
"rough" measure used by the researcher to gather data on
this variable. It is felt that a more formal and detailed
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measure o£ appearance and cleanliness based on the assess-
ments of several. observers would have been more meaningful and
might have yielded different results.
4. Hypothesis (H:4) on retention was also not supported
by this study. The near zero correlation on this variable
is very difficult to explain. The only explanation that
the author can offer is that the decision of a sailor to
stay in the Navy is the result of many different factors.
The Level of Role Ambiguity between the CO and XO apparently
is simply not that important a factor in this decision. As
with the appearance variable, a larger and more sophisticated
study on the relationship between Level of Role Ambiguity
and retention might support this hypothesis.
5. As a final test to determine whether Level of Role
Ambiguity is related to a ship's performance, a correlation
coefficient was determined for the composite rating calcu-
lated for each ship. The manner in which the Composite
Performance scores were determined was discussed in
paragraph VI, A. 11 above. The Composite score was designed
to give the researcher an overall measure of a ship's
performance effectiveness. As can be noted in Table 4-2,
the correlation coefficient for Level of Role Ambiguity and
Composite Performance was .3926 and was significant to the
.043 level.
While some of the individual variables measured in this
study failed to support the stated hypotheses, the strong
S3

positive correlation between Level of Role Ambiguity and
Composite Performance scores suggests that a ship's per-
formance is, in fact, significantly affected by the Level
of Role Ambiguity between its CO and XO.
C. RESULTS OF "t" TEST
As was pointed out in paragraph IV, A-3, the initial
data examined suggested that the ship's COs felt they had
discussed the matter of how leadership tasks should be
handled to a considerable extent (mean score of 3.65),
whereas the XOs sampled responded less positively on this
item (mean score of 3.55). The author believed that this
might be an indication that the XOs desired additional
guidance in this area. That is, the XOs did not feel that
this issue had been discussed enough and might therefore
cause them undue anxiety. If this proved to be an accurate
assessment of the situation, a case could then be built for
recommending to COs that a greater amount of guidance on
this subject was desired by their XOs.
The author, therefore, decided to see if the difference
in the mean scores for Extent of Discussion from CO ' s View
and Extent of Discussion from XO's View was, in fact,
statistically significant. The "t" test was used to
evaluate this relationship. The results of this test are
listed in Table 4.3 The test failed to support the claim





























































the mean scores. While the mean score for Extent o£
Discussion from XO's View is slightly less, this difference
could easily have been caused by sampling error rather than
population differences.
D. TASK VS. SOCIAL -EMOTIONAL
Another interesting observation which can be made by
viewing the data in Table 4-2 is that Level of Role Ambiguity
is strongly correlated with the NAVFORSTAT variables which
deal primarily with social-emotional related issues,
specifically Personnel Readiness and Training Readiness.
Conversely, the variable Equipment Readiness which would
be primarily task related shows no correlation with Level
of Role Ambiguity. The variable Supply Readiness which
would involve a combination of social -emotional and task-
oriented behavior was shown to have a fairly strong rela-
tionship with Level of Role Ambiguity.
This suggests to the author that high levels of role
ambiguity between COs and their XOs will have the greatest
effect on shipboard performance measures which are most
directly related to social-oriented leadership. Likewise,
those performance measures which are more closely related
to task-oriented leadership are least affected by the Level
of Role Ambiguity between the CO and XO. This might also
help to explain why the ships' appearance ratings failed to
show any correlations with Level of Role .Ambiguity.
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Maintaining a "clean" ship certainly requires task-oriented
leadership.
Further research would be required to understand the
relationship between Level of Role Ambiguity and task-
oriented leadership versus social-oriented leadership.
The data o£ this study does, however, suggest that the
social-emotional oriented leadership measures are most
affected by the Level of Role Ambiguity.
This chapter has provided the reader with a look at
the data which resulted from this study and the author's
interpretation of the salient points derived from it.
The author also interjected possible explanations of devia-
tions in the expected relationships where it was felt
appropriate. The author will now conclude this paper by
reviewing the key points of the study and providing recom-
mendations for possible follow-on research projects.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
Taking command of a ship is a straightforward procedure,
well covered by written directives. The problem of
exercising command as to produce an effective fighting
unit are not always so simple.
. . . [Cope, 1956, p. 4]
For those readers who have had command of a Naval ship
the significance of the above quotation need not be expounded
upon. For those who have chosen other career paths the
statement may have no significance. To those remaining
readers who aspire to the goal of "Command at Sea," the
author would recommend careful consideration of these words.
Not only are the "problems of exercising command. . .
not always so simple," they are often exceedingly difficult!
This study focused primarily on just one aspect of command,
the relationship of a Commanding Officer to his second in
command, his XO. An attempt was made in the study to show
how role ambiguity affects this relationship, and the effect
role ambiguity can have on a ship's performance. Even in
this one aspect of command, the potential for numerous
problems was observed.
The author began this report by examining the unique
relationship which exists between a ship's commanding
officer and his executive officer. Several factors of the
relationship which could lead to role conflict and role
58

ambiguity were discussed. These factors were: the need to
delegate, the existence of formal and informal "Chains of
Command," and the influence of belief in Dual Management
theory concepts.
Having described why the CO/XO relationship creates the
potential for role conflict and role ambiguity, the
adverse effects which role conflict and role ambiguity can
have on an organization were examined with the aid of
applicable literature. This examination indicated that role
problems can have a pronounced negative impact on both
organizations and the individuals within the organizations.
With these thoughts in mind the author set out to empiri-
cally answer two questions: (1) Does role ambiguity, in
fact, exist between CCs and XOs? .And (2) if so, does this
role ambiguity affect a ship's performance?
The author found that CO/XO role ambiguity does exist
(at least as measured by the survey instrument) and that it
does appear to affect some shipboard performance measures.
Those measures for which a high degree of social-emotional
oriented leadership would be involved showed the strongest
correlation to level of CO/XO role ambiguity. Those areas
for which a high degree of task-oriented leadership would be
required appeared to be unrelated to the Level of CO/XO
Role Ambiguity. Surprisingly, the data indicated that
CO/XO Role Ambiguity is unrelated to a ship's retention rate
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A strong negative relationship was observed between
the CO/XO Level o£ Role Ambiguity and the extent to which
COs and XOs have discussed the distribution of leadership
roles. This suggests that COs and XOs can reduce the Level
of Role Ambiguity through effective two-way communication.
The author feels that this study has shown that CO/XO
role clarification problems do exist and that they create
real problems for both the command and members of the
command. It has also indicated that CO/XO Role Ambiguity
can be reduced and that lower levels of ambiguity appear
to improve a ship's readiness and effectiveness.
While the observed correlations in this study were not
extremely significant in several cases, the following quote
by Stone (1978) should be kept in mind:
. .
.measurement of variables with instruments having
less than perfect reliability will lead to an observed
relationship that is often considerably lower than the
true relationship. [Stone, 1978, p. 50]
Since the instruments used in this study would undoubtedly
"have less than perfect reliability," the true relationship
between the level of CO/XO role ambiguity and a ship's




This study has potential implications for the Navy in
several respects. First of all, data relating the effect of
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role ambiguity on unit performance should be made available
to perspective COs and XOs
. This would help instill in
them the realization that they can expect problems with
role clarification and the benefit to be gained by actively
discussing this issue. Second, data should be made available
to Navy Human Resource Management (HRM) /Organization
Development (OD) consultants. This study could be used by
them to demonstrate to their clients the value of role
clarification workshops. The consultants could also use
the data to show COs and XOs that their level of role
ambiguity can be reduced and, once reduced, can lead to
increased effectiveness for the command.
It is felt that the ship's XOs would benefit personally
if this information were provided to their COs by HRM/OD
consultants. IVhen CO/XO role ambiguity does occur, the XO
would be most likely to suffer the greatest psychological
stress. Being junior to the CO, he has fewer acceptable
ways to deal with the stress which role conflicts and
ambiguity create. Also CO/XO teams which had lower levels
of ambiguity and stress were shown to have more effective
units. The potential value of role clarification can,
therefore, be seen not only in terms of improved unit per-
formance, but also in terms of improved emotional health and
personal well-being of command members.
Although the results of this study are promising, the
sample is relatively small and focused on a very specific
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category. Additional research is needed to identify the
effects role conflicts (including role ambiguity) have at
various levels of a command on unit performance. Likewise,
research into the relationship of role conflict and unit
effectiveness should be done for other types of military
commands. Investigation of the type conducted in this study
performed on aviation squadrons might prove very successful.
This study also suggests that personnel retention and
equipment readiness are unrelated to CO/XO level of role
ambiguity. Additional research into what these measures
are most closely related with would also be of value to the
Navy. In Chapter Four of this report it was noted that the
Level of CO/XO Role .'\mbiguity was strongly related to those
measures which require primarily social-oriented leadership
behavior but was not related to those performance measures
for which task-oriented leadership was required. Research
explaining why these relationships are this way could be of
real benefit to a CO/XO team.
During the course of this report the author has made a
number of sweeping generalizations and several statements
which were weakly supported at best. The author realizes
that role conflict is only one aspect of the complex
environment of a shipboard command or any formal organization.
Because of this complexity there are no simple solutions to




It is hoped that some light has been shed on one of
these problems. If so the time and effort which were





The attached questionnaire contains two parts. Part I
asks for general and demographic information. Part II is
a list of leadership or managerial functions often performed
by ship's Commanding Officers and Executive Officers. You
are requested to place the appropriate letters (using the
code below) that best describe how these roles/functions
are handled on board your ship.
"R" Responsible--the person who is responsible for
initiating action and for ensuring the function is
carried out.
"A" or "V" Approval required, or the right to veto--
indicates that the person reserves the right to veto
an action and the person responsible must gain approval
on his proposed action.
"S" Support- -indicates that while not responsible for
the function, the person does provide assistance of
some type to the person responsible for the function.
"I" Informed'-indicates the person is to be kept informed
on action to be taken/taken, but does not have (or does
not want) approval or veto authority.
"NC" Not concerned with--indicates that the person is
in no way concerned with this particular item at your
command.
For purposes of this questionnaire, your responses
should be in terms of how these functions are currently
performed within your command. If a particular function/
role does not apply, please answer the question as you
would prefer or expect the function to be handled if it
were to arise. If someone other than the CO or XO is
responsible for initiating the action and for ensuring the
function is carried out, please list that person by their
title (ex: OPS, ENG, etc.) in the column marked "Responsi-
bility Of."
The responses of each individual and each command to
this questionnaire will be held in strict confidence. The
64

results are to be used in conjunction with my master's
thesis and no reference to specific commands will be
made
.










Number of months you have worked with your
current XO/CO:
This question is for CQs only :
To what extent have you dis-
cussed with your XO the command
leadership tasks you expect him
to handle and which ones you
desire to perform yourself?




(1) To a very
little extent




(4) To a great
extent
(5) To a very
great extent
This question is for XOs only:
To what extent has your CO
discussed with you the command
leadership tasks he expects
you to perform and those he
desires to handle himself?
(Please check the appropriate
response
.
(1) To a very
little extent




(4) To a great
extent





A/V- -Approval or Veto
S- -Support
PART II
LEADERSHIP TASK OR FUNCTION
I - -Informed
NC--Not Concerned With
1. Establish standard daily
inport and at sea routines
for the ship.
2. Counsel department heads
on their fitness reports.
3. Handle inquiries from
the press or news media
(TV, radio, newspaper,
etc.)
4. Establish command grooming
standards and ensure they
are properly adhered to.
5. Ensure the ship's daily
routine is adhered to as
closely as possible.
6. Ensure dependents of crew
members are kept informed
of the ship's activities
(via a family-gram or
similar means)
.
7. Determine punishment to
be awarded at Captain's
Mast.
8. Counsel the departmental
heads on career pattern or
career opportunities.
9. Respond to Congressional
letters of investigation.
CO/XO's ROLE









PART II (Page 2)
LEADERSHIP TASK OR FUNCTION: CO/XO's ROLE
CO XO RESPONSIBILITY OF
(Please List)
10. Ensure proper procedures
are followed to safeguard
classified material.
11. Conduct routine inspections
of the ship's "living"
spaces
.
12. Reprimand or discipline
department heads if
necessary.
13. Conduct routine inspections
of topside areas and non-




14. Prepare and maintain bills
and orders of the command
as a whole
.
15. Supervise and coordinate
the training of the ship's
officers
.
16. Coordinate the work of
personnel of the command.
17. Establish routine working
hours and liberty policy
for the command.
18. Control "shore leave" policy
for the crew.
19. Establish holiday leave




A/V- -Approval or Veto
S- -Support
PART II (Page 3)




CO XO RESPONSIBILITY OF
(Please ListJ
20. Coordinate selection of
liberty ports for the ship
21. Establish post deployment
leave policy.
22. Interface with personnel
at the squadron or group
level on matters dealing
with the ship's schedule.
23. Supervise and coordinate
the distribution of the
command OPTAR fund.
24. Interface with NAVPERS to
prevent or overcome person
nel shortages in officer
manning
.
25. Interface with NAVPERS to
prevent or overcome person
nel shortages in enlisted
manning
26. Supervise and coordinate
the ship's overhaul or
RAV/TAV repair packages.
27. Maintain high officer
morale
.
28. Ensure the morale of the
crew is kept as high as
possible.
29. Ensure the ship's prepared-
ness for all external





R- -Responsible I --Informed
A/V- -Approval or Veto NC--Not Concerned With
S--Support
PART II (Page 4)
LEADERSHIP TASK OR FUNCTION: CO/XO's ROLE
CO XO RESPONSIBILITY OF
(Please ListJ
30. Ensure the ship is prepared






RETENTION DATA CONVERSION AND REGROUPING
In order to enable the author to include unit retention
data in the unit composite rating in a meaningful way, the
following procedure was followed. First, the data was grouped
in five categories with ones (1) for the poorest retainers and
fives (5) for the best retainers. The order of the groups was
then reversed so that the scores would correspond appropriately
with the other performance data (i.e., one would indicate top
performance)
.



















FREQUENCY CHARTS AND HISTOGRAMS
LEVEL OF ROLE AMBIGUITY
CATEGORY LABEL
FREQUENCY CHART
CODE ABSOLUTE RELATIVE ADJUSTED CUMULATIVE
FREQUENCY FREQUENCY FREQUENCY FREQUENCY
(PCT) (PCT) (PCT)
1. 1 5.0 5.0 5.0
3. 2 10.0 10.0 15.0
5. 4 20.0 20.0 35.0
6. 4 20.0 20.0 55.0
7. 4 20.0 20.0 75.0
8. 1 5.0 5.0 80.0
10. 1 5.0 5.0 85.0
12. 1 5.0 5.0 90.0
13. 10.0 10.0 100.0
TOTAL 20 100.0 100.0
CODE INTERPRETATION: The scale on this variable
is zero (0) indicating the presence of no role
ambiguity to thirty (30) indicating absolute
ambiguity. The observed sample range was from
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EXTENT OF DISCUSSION GO'S VIEW
FREQUENCY CHART
CODE ABSOLUTE RELATIVE ADJUSTED CUMULATIVE
FREQUENCY FREQUENCY FREQUENCY FREQUENCY
(PCT) (PCT) (PCT)
2. 2 10.0 10.0 10.0
3. 5 25.0 25.0 35.0








(1) To a very little extent
(2) To a little extent
(3) To some extent
(4) To a great extent
(5) To a very great extent
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EXTENT OF DISCUSSION XO ' S VIEW
FREQUENCY CHART
CATEGORY LABEL
CODE ABSOLUTE RELATIVE ADJUSTED CUMULATIVE
FREQUENCY FREQUENCY FREQUENCY FREQUENCY
(PCT) (PCT) (PCT)
2
. 2 10.0 10.0 10.0
3
. 8 40.0 40.0 50.0
4. 7 35.0 35.0 85.0
5. 3 15.0 15.0 100.0
TOTAL 20 100.0 100.0
CODE INTERPRETATION:
(1) To a very little extent
(2) To a little extent
(3) To some extent
(4) To a great extent
(5) To a very great extent
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CODE ABSOLUTE RELATIVE ADJUSTED CUMULATIVE
FREQUENCY FREQUENCY FREQUENCY FREQUENCY
(PCT) (PCT) (PCT)
13. 1 5.0 5.0 5.0
17. 1 5.0 5.0 10.0
18. 1 5.0 5.0 15.0
20. 1 5.0 5.0 20.0
26. 1 5.0 5.0 25.0
27. 1 5.0 5.0 30.0
29. 2 10.0 10.0 40.0
31. 3 15.0 15.0 55.0
32. 2 10.0 10.0 65.0
33. 1 5.0 5.0 70.0
40. 1 5.0 5.0 75.0
44. 2 10.0 10.0 85.0
45. 1 5.0 5.0 90.0
46. 1 5.0 5.0 95.0
59. 1 5.0 5.0 100.0
TOTAL 20 100.0 100.0
CODE INTERPRETATION: The codes on this variable
equate to the ship's overall retention percentage
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APPEARANCE AND CLEANLINESS RATING
FREQUENCY CHART
CATEGORY LABEL
CODE ABSOLUTE RELATIVE ADJUSTED CUMULATIVE
FREQUENCY FREQUENCY FREQUENCY FREQUENCY
(PCT) (PCT) (PCT)
1. 5 25.0 25.0 25.0
2. 7 35 .0 35.0 60.0
3
.
4 20.0 20.0 80.0
4. 2 10.0 10.0 90.0
5. 2 10.0 10.0 100.0
TOTAL 20 100.0 100.0
CODE INTERPRETATION:
(1) Extremely good appearance
(2) Above average appearance
(3) Average appearance
(4) Below average appearance
(5) Extremely poor appearance
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APPEARANCE AND CLEANLINESS RATING
HISTOGRAM
CODE
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COMPOSITE OF ALL RATING VARIABLES
FREQUENCY CHART
CATEGORY LABEL
CODE ABSOLUTE RELATIVE ADJUSTED CUMULATIVE
FREQUENCY FREQUENCY FREQUENCY FREQUENCY
(PCT) (PCT) (PCT)
1.71 1 5.0 5.0 5.0
1.86 3 15.0 15.0 20.0
2. on 3 15.0 15.0 35.0
2.14 2 10.0 10.0 45.0
2.28 1 5.0 5.0 50.0
2. 57-. 59 5 25.0 25^0 75.0
2.71 2 10.0 10.0 85.0
2.86 1 5.0 5.0 90.0
•
3.14 1 5.0 5.0 100.0
TOTAL 20 100.0 100.0
CODE INTERPRETATION: The possible range of
codes on the composite rating was from 1.0
to 4.28. A lower numerical value for this
code indicates a more effective/better ship
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